Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions by Marina E. Henke

Author:Marina E. Henke [Henke, Marina E.]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: International Relations, Diplomacy, General, Military, Political Science, Wars & Conflicts (Other), History, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781501739712
Google: tMJ8DwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 2019-10-15T07:42:44+00:00

7

Resisting Rebels in Chad and the Central African Republic

EUFOR Chad-CAR (2008–2009)

The key to understanding the conflict in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) lies in the outbreak of the Darfur crisis in early 2003 (for details, see also chapter 5). Darfur borders Chad and the CAR in the west. At the beginning of the Darfur conflict, key members of the Darfur rebel factions organizing the insurgency against Khartoum were of Chadian origin. They were using the Chadian and Central African sides of the border region as support bases for their fight against Sudanese president Al-Bashir.1 Traditionally, Al-Bashir had kept a good relationship with the Chadian president Idriss Déby. So when the Darfur crisis erupted, Al-Bashir asked Déby to assist him in suppressing the rebellion from his side of the border. Initially, Déby agreed to support Al-Bashir in exchange for money and military equipment from Sudan. However, Déby was forced to renege on his agreement shortly thereafter due to mounting disapproval among his domestic ethnic support base.2 Displeased by Déby’s reversal, Al-Bashir responded by throwing his support behind disgruntled Chadians eager to see their president overthrown.3 By mid-2005, over 275,000 refugees were trapped in the middle of this Sudanese-Chadian proxy war. Most of them were forced to live in crowded, unsanitary refugee camps on the Chadian and Central African sides of the border,4 wherein banditry and violent attacks as well as human rights abuses such as sexual violence were prevalent.5

In an effort to address this complex situation, the EU deployed EUFOR Chad-CAR. The key objective of the force was to protect civilians living in the refugee camps, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel operating in the conflict area.6 The operation was authorized by UN Resolution 1778, which passed on September 25, 2007. The EU Council approved the force on October 15, 2007, and the first EU military troops deployed to Chad-CAR in early February 2008. Operations lasted until March 2009, when a UN follow-up force (MINURCAT) took the relay from EUFOR Chad-CAR. The operation involved approximately 3,700 troops provided by the following countries: France (2,000 forces), Ireland (450 forces), Poland (400 forces), Sweden (280 forces), Austria (170 forces), Russia (100 forces), Italy (90 forces), Netherlands (90 forces), Spain (80 forces), Belgium (70 forces), Finland (60 forces), Albania (60 forces), Croatia (15 forces), and Slovenia (15 forces).

France initiated and politically orchestrated the deployment of EUFOR Chad-CAR. France worked relentlessly at the UN to pass a UN resolution that would authorize the EU mission and plan for the EU-UN transition.7 France introduced the issue at the EU Council and lobbied EU member states to support the proposal.8 Most EU members did not share France’s urgency to deploy an EU operation to Chad-CAR. So it was up to France to cajole these countries to contribute forces to the coalition. In this process, France instrumentalized diplomatic embeddedness. It exploited its EU connections and other diplomatic ties to assess deployment preferences of potential troop contributors and to construct issue linkages and side payments.

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